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Three Views of Real Interest
After 1979, interest rates in the U.s. economy
oecamemucFi-iTiOrevOlatHe:Forexalllple,fhe
degree ofvolatiIity in short-term interest rates
nearly doubled. At the same time, real interest
rates (nominal rates adjusted for inflation) fluctu-
ated around much higher levels than before.
Since 1982, however, the volatility of short-term
real rates has declined. More recently, the gen-
eral level of real interest rates has tended to
diminish as well.
Analysts have proposed three main explanations
for these phenomena. First, they point to the lift-
ing of deposit rate ceilings and other types of
financial deregulation. Second is the October
1979 shift in the Federal Reserve's operating
procedures, which put more emphasis on con-
trolling bank reserves and less on controlling
interest rates in the short run. The final explana-
tion relates to the effects of large and growing
federal budget deficits in the United States. This
Letter discusses the theoretical relevance of
these explanations and presents some empirical
evidence to help discriminate among them.
Financial deregulation
During periods oftight credit prior to 1979, Reg-
ulation Q ceilings on deposit rates tended to
restrict deposit flows into thrift institutions that
specialized in housing finance. Although com-
mercial banks also experienced run-offs in time
and savings deposits, they were better able to
offset the effects through asset and liability
management.
Thrifts had difficulty offsetting the lack of deposit
inflows by selling mortgage loans from their
portfolios because of a relatively undeveloped
secondary market and an unwillingness to show
capital losses. They were also slow to develop
new sources offunds and, in fact, did not issue
significant amounts of large CDs until the late
1970s. In addition, usury ceilings reinforced the
short-run tendency of mortgage lenders to ration
credit by means other than interest rates. To the
extent that these restrictions in the availability of
lllorfgagecredit atthrift institutions could not be
offset by other lenders, fluctuations in residential
investment were more severe.
Regulation Q ceilings also tended to reduce the
extent to which market interest rates on assets
other than mortgage loans rose during periods of
tight credit. In the extreme case where lenders
regard thrift deposits and alternative market
instruments as perfect substitutes, these market
interest rates would not rise above the level of
Regulation Q ceilings on deposit rates unless the
level of deposits were drivento zero. On the
more realistic assumption that deposits at thrifts
are regarded as imperfect substitutes for alterna-
tive market instruments by at least some deposi-
tors, a positive interest differential would be
required to attract funds away from deposits in
periods of tight credit. In this more realistic case,
market interest rates would rise as credit condi-
tions tightened, but not by as much as they
would in a completely unregulated financial
environment.
Over the last decade, the market for mortgage
credit has become more integrated with other
financial markets mainly because of financial
deregulation. Greater integration has tended
both to reduce credit availability effects on
housing and to increase the volatility of market
interest rates. A recent study conducted at this
Bank found that deposit rate ceilings and related
factors did indeed exacerbate the housing cycle
and reduce the volatility of market interest rates
to a small but measurable degree prior to 1979.
Financial deregulation was found to lessen the
severity of the housing cycle and to increase the
volatility of interest rates in a simulation that
removed the estimated effects of depositflows in
the 1966-67, 1969-70, and 1974-75 periods of
disintermediation and which assumed an
unchanged rate of monetary growth. However,
the quantitative magnitudes of these effects were
estimated to be relatively small.FRBSF
The simulated effects on interest rates are shown
in the chart, which compares the historical path
ofthe real, or inflation-adjusted, 6-month com-
mercial paper rate over the period 1962 to 1985
with that resulting from the simulation where no
credit availability effects are allowed to operate
throughthe~ff~tts6fdepbsirfl6ws.
The simulation shows that, in the absence of
credit availability effects, real interest rates
would have risen by somewhat more in periods
oftight credit. However, because the effects
themselves are estimated to have been quite
small,the estimated increase in the overall vari-
ability of real interest rates is also small. In the
1966 to 1975 period, the standard deviation of
the real commercial paper rate from its average
level rises from 131 basis points in the historical
observation to 141 basis points in the simula-
tion. This small rise indicates that financial
deregulation produc~d only a 7.6 percent
increase in the volatility of real short-term inter-
est rates.
After 1979, the actual variability ofreal short-
term interest rates nearly doubled. Thus, the esti-
mated effects of financial deregulation explain
only a very small portion of the increased vari-
ability in real interest rates. Deregulation also
does not fully explain the rise inthe level of real
interest rates after 1979. In the simulation,
deregulation raised the levels of real interest
rates very little, whereas the average level of real
short-term rates increased about 400 basis points
after 1979.
Monetary policy
One alternative explanation forthe· increase in
the variability and level of real interest rates after
1979 is the effect ofthe Federal Reserve's switch
in operating procedures in October of that year.
The Federal Reserve put greater emphasis on
controlling bank reserves and less on controlling
interest rates in the short run. The new pro-
cedure should have increased the shorHun vol~
atility ofinterestrates because itmeant that the
Fed would no longer tend to accommodate
short-run changes in the demand for money.
The Fed directed this new operating procedure
at slowing the rate of monetary growth to reduce
inflation. Reductions in monetary growth would
have produced temporary increases in the level
of real interest rates until the price level had
fully adjusted to a reduced stock of money. The
slowing in monetary growth, thus, probably con-
tributed to peaks in real interest rates from 1979
through 1982, but it cannot explain the con-
tihuedhigh level of real interest rates since then.
In October 1982, when financial deregulation
and disinflation were making monetary velocity
much more unpredictable, the Federal Reserve
shifted back to an operating procedure charac-
terized by less precise short-run control over
monetary growth. This shift provides a good
explanation for the reduction in the volatility of
interest rates that occurred after 1982. But real
short-term interest rates were still about 200
basis points higher than in the pre-1979 period.
Large federal deficit
The federal budget deficit is the most important
reason for continued high u.s. real interest rates
after 1982, and there have been two main facets
to its impact. First, larger U.S. budget deficits
tend to drive up the international level of real
interest rates. Because the world capital market
is highly integrated and securities are highly sub-
stitutable, real interest rates tend to be equated
across countries.
The u.s. structural budget position (including
state and local as well as federal governments)
shifted from a surplus equal to 1.2 percent of
GNP in 1979 to a deficit equal to 2.1 percent of
GNP in 1986.Atthe same time, the budget defi-
cits of other major industrialized countries have
shown little long-term trend. Thus, the net effect
of larger u.s. budget deficits should have been
to increase the world level of real interest rates.
Second, even in a fully integrated world capital
market, real interest rates take several years to
equalize across countries after a disturbance.
The initial effect of larger u.s. budget deficits is
to drive up real interest rates at homecompared
to those abroad. This leads to an increase in
desired net capital inflows, which generates an
appreciation of the dollar. But the interest dif-
ferential in favor ofthe u.s. causes the dollar to
overshootits long-run equilibrium. An expected
future depreciation ofthe dollar compensates for




Shaded areas represent periods of estimated credit availability effects.
"Without credit availability effects·of regulation.
As the full effect of a dollarappreciation man-
ifests itself in a change in the trade balance, and
thus in actual capital flows, u.s. real interest
rates then tend to fall back toward foreign levels.
u.S. short-term real interest rates remained rela-
tively high from 1982 through 1984, but have
since dropped close to foreign real rates. This
suggests that the equalization process is nearly
complete.
The equalization process may be attenuated
somewhat by the effects of a growing accumula-
tion of debt to foreigners. As foreigners absorb
more and more u.s. debt, they may require a
larger differential in the rate of return over
investments in their home countries. This would
reduce the size ofthe net capital inflows occur-
ring in response to the u.s. budget deficit and
drive a wedge between u.s. and foreign real
interest rates. Although the weight ofthe evi-
dence suggests that such differentials are small
and that the world capital market is indeed
highly integrated, the foreign accumulation of
u.s. debt is occurring rapidly enough that this
factor may be of some importance in holding up
u.s. real rates.
Conclusion
TheLJrll.lsLJally high level and volatility of real
interest rates after 1979 are best explained by a
combination of factors. An econometric simula-
tion indicates that financial deregulation contrib-
uted only slightly. By producing higher peak
levels of interest rates in periods of tight credit,
financial deregulation tended to raise both the
average level and volatility of real rates, but our
estimates show these effects to be quite small.
Of greater importance have been the effects of
monetary policy. The heightened volatility of
.interest rates from October 1979 to October
1982 was due basically to the Federal Reserve's
shift in operating procedure that aimed at reduc-
ing inflation by slowing money growth. This pro-
cedure sought greater short-run control over
bank reserves. When the Fed again changed its
operating procedure in October 1982 toward
less emphasis on controlling bank reserves in the
short run, the volatility of interest rates fell sig-
nificantly. Also, the Fed's disinflation policy
could have generated higher real interest rates,
but not for a prolonged period of tim~.
Real interest rates have been held at higher lev-
els primarily by larger u.s. budget deficits. In an
integrated world capital market, U.s. budget def-
icits drive up the world level of real interest
rates. Since real interest rates take several years
to equalize across countries after such a distur-
bance, u.s. real rates tend to rise by more than
foreign rates for a while. Also, Us. real interest
rates may stabilize at a somewhat higher level
than foreign rates if foreign investors require a
higher relative return for their continued
investment.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 202,723 834 5,775 2.9
Loans and Leases1 6 182,101 911 4,281 2.4
Commercial and Industrial 49,754 9 - 919 - 1.8
Real estate 66,811 131 1,418 2.1
Loans to Individuals 39,478 - 51 1,704 4.5
Leases 5,617 1 228 4.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,639 66 810 6.8
Other Securities2 7,982 - 143 681 9.3
Total Deposits 210,243 4,426 5,920 2.8
Demand Deposits 57,180 4,6'14 5,319 10.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,468 - 965 - 11,831 - 25.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 17,773 - 114 3,475 24.3
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,291 - 73 - 2,872 - 2.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,858 483 1,515 3.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 33,136 - 445 - 5,287 - 13.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,981 - 605 2,528 10.3
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-l
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change